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THE INTERPRETIVE DIMENSION OF SEMINOLE ROCK
Kevin M. Stack*

INTRODUCTION
A lively debate has emerged over the merits and scope of application
of a long-standing doctrine governing the deference a court accords an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. That doctrine, traditionally
associated with Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.1 and now more frequently attributed to Auer v. Robbins,2 states that a court must accept an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations unless the interpretation is
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”3 In recent years,
Justice Antonin Scalia has issued separate opinions calling for the doctrine
to be reconsidered and abandoned.4 Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice
Samuel Alito, and Justice Clarence Thomas have also announced their
openness to reevaluating the doctrine.5
*

Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research, Vanderbilt University Law School. For
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, I am grateful to the participants in this Conference and
preceding roundtable discussion, and especially to Jonathan Adler, Caroline Cecot, Sanne Kudsen,
Neomi Rao, Kip Viscusi, and Amy Wildermuth.
1 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
2 519 U.S. 452 (1997). This doctrine was traditionally associated with Seminole Rock, but since
1997 the Supreme Court and other courts have frequently attributed it to Auer. See, e.g., Talk Am., Inc.
v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265-66 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Seminole
Rock doctrine has recently been attributed to Auer, despite the fact that Auer involved a straightforward
application of Seminole Rock (see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (relying on Seminole Rock with little ado))).
This Article generally refers to the doctrine as Seminole Rock or Seminole Rock/Auer, but following
judicial practice does not make a distinction between Seminole Rock and Auer.
3 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
359 (1989) (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Three justices
have indicated an interest in reconsidering this doctrine. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
1326, 1338 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (joining with Justice Alito in noting that “[i]t may be
appropriate to reconsider” Seminole Rock/Auer in another case); id. at 1339, 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (urging the Court to overturn Seminole Rock/Auer).
4 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (urging the
Court to overturn Seminole Rock/Auer); Talk America, 131 S. Ct. at 2265-66 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(criticizing the doctrine and announcing his interest in reconsidering it); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1213 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (urging overruling of Auer).
5 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that “[i]t may be appropriate
to reconsider” Seminole Rock/Auer in another case); Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that “the entire line of precedent beginning with Seminole Rock raises serious constitutional
questions and should be reconsidered”); cf. The Supreme Court 2011 Term: Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 Auer Deference: Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 126 HARV. L. REV. 176, 357-58
(2012) (noting increasing scrutiny of the doctrine).
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As these justices have expressed an interest in reconsidering Seminole
Rock, the Supreme Court has clarified the scope of the doctrine’s application. First, in Gonzales v. Oregon,6 the Court made clear that if a regulation
merely repeats statutory language, the agency’s interpretation of that repeated language does not qualify for deference under Seminole Rock.7 Second, in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,8 the Court declined to
accord deference to an agency interpretation in an amicus brief, and did so
in a way that called into question whether the Court would continue treating
agency briefs as worthy of receiving deference under Seminole Rock.9
Further narrowing of Seminole Rock’s application seems likely given
the disjuncture in the scope of application of Seminole Rock and Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.10 created by the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Mead Corp.11 In Mead, the Court constricted the application of Chevron deference to statutes that grant lawmaking authority to the agency and to agency actions exercising that authority.12
Under Mead, notice-and-comment rulemaking is presumptively eligible for
Chevron deference, whereas guidance documents and litigation briefs are
not.13 In contrast, under Seminole Rock, an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulation in a guidance document or litigation brief still generally
qualifies for deference.14 In an appropriate case, it would not take a grand
leap for the Supreme Court to bring the scope of Seminole Rock’s application in line with Chevron’s, as commentators have advocated.15 Moreover,
the careful research by Professors Amy Wildermuth and Sanne Knudsen on
the transformation of the Court’s decision in Seminole Rock into a free-

6

546 U.S. 243 (2006).
See id. at 257 (“An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when,
instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”).
8 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
9 See id. at 2170-73.
10 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
12 Id. at 226-27.
13 Id. at 229.
14 See, e.g., Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 n.3 (2011) (according Auer deference to
a litigation brief of the United States); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 883-84 (2011)
(rejecting the argument that an agency amicus brief was not entitled to deference under Auer, and according deference to the interpretation contained in the brief); but see Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012) (denying Auer deference to an agency litigation brief).
15 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 900 (2001)
(“Seminole Rock deference should at a minimum be subject to the same limitations that apply to the
scope of Chevron deference.”); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1484-96 (2011) (arguing that Mead’s logic for constraining Chevron’s scope
of application extends to Seminole Rock).
7
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standing, generally applicable doctrine reveals other lines for reevaluating
the doctrine’s scope of application.16
The reappraisal of Seminole Rock by jurists and scholars has, however,
largely neglected the underlying question of the method a court employs to
interpret a regulation—that is, the method of regulatory interpretation.
When a court evaluates an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation
under Seminole Rock, it still must adopt some method of interpreting the
regulation to assess whether the agency’s action is “plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” Does the court make that determination of
consistency by evaluating the regulation’s text alone or in view of other
considerations? What interpretive tools does it invoke? Merely specifying
that Seminole Rock applies neither resolves the question of interpretive approach nor obviates the need for it.
In other contexts, it is widely acknowledged that a framework of review requires adopting an interpretive approach. For instance, a court cannot apply Chevron to assess the validity of agency action under a statute
without adopting an approach to statutory interpretation. The point is an
analogous one here: a court cannot assess the validity of agency interpretations of their own regulations without adopting (at least implicitly) a method of regulatory interpretation. Indeed, the need for an approach to interpretation holds regardless of the standard of review that applies. If a court were
to invoke a less deferential standard of review to agency constructions of
their own regulations, such as that of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,17 as some
commentators have advocated and the Supreme Court has on occasion applied,18 the court would even more clearly need to adopt an approach to
regulatory interpretation. To put this basic point in more general terms, a
framework of review of the validity of an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations has two important dimensions: the standard of review and the
method of interpreting the regulation.19
16

See Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Lessons from the Lost History of Seminole
Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
17 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
18 See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham, 132 U.S. at 2169 (applying Skidmore to review an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference
to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 686-87 (1996) [hereinafter Manning, Constitutional Structure] (arguing for adoption of the Skidmore standard).
19 Another dimension that is not as critical for present purposes is the timing of reasons. The
timing of reasons concerns whether the court will uphold the agency’s position for any reasons given,
even those offered post hoc in litigation, or whether the court will uphold the agency’s action only for
reasons that the agency itself provided at the time it acted. This dimension is binary: uphold for any
conceivable reason versus uphold only for reasons relied upon by the actor at the time of acting. In
general, courts will uphold agency action only for reasons upon which the agency relied at the time it
acted. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld
unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its
action can be sustained.”).
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This Article argues that a court’s choice of interpretive method may be
just as important, if not more important, to the outcome of review of the
validity of an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations as the standard
of review the court applies. That is, deference to the agency’s interpretation
of its own regulations may be as much a function of the court’s choice of
interpretive method as the standard of review it adopts. If the framework of
review is a problem with two dimensions—the standard of review and the
interpretive method—then there is reason to evaluate the likely effects of
different methods of regulatory interpretation. That investigation promises
to shed light on the ways in which particular interpretive methods are likely
to be more or less deferential to agency actions, as well as on the level of
notice those methods provide the public of the regulation’s meaning.
The distinctive legal character of notice-and-comment regulations issued under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)—that they must be
accompanied by an explanatory statement of their purpose, a statement of
“basis and purpose,”20 to be procedurally and substantively valid—holds
interesting implications for this interpretive question. In particular, building
on my other writing on regulatory interpretation,21 this Article argues that
interpreting regulations in light of these explanatory statements, frequently
referred to as a regulation’s “preamble,” results in a narrower range of acceptable readings of the regulation, and offers greater notice of the regulation’s meaning than looking to the regulatory text alone. As a result, this
method of regulatory interpretation, which this Article calls regulatory
purposivism, holds promise for addressing many of the concerns raised by
Seminole Rock, whether or not the Supreme Court decides to overrule the
doctrine.
I.

SEMINOLE ROCK AND ITS CHALLENGES

Administrative agencies frequently offer interpretations of their own
regulations, whether in adjudicative decisions, guidance documents, the
preambles to the regulations, opinion letters, or briefs. Firm numbers on the
volume of guidance documents and agency adjudications are hard to find,
20

5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 357 (2012) (highlighting the
lack of attention to regulatory interpretation and proposing a textually constrained purposive theory of
regulatory interpretation). In this symposium contribution, the focus is on how the method of regulatory
interpretation defended in Interpreting Regulations, supra, applies in the context of Seminole Rock; the
timing of this contribution did not permit engagement with Professor Jennifer Nou’s forthcoming article
Regulatory Textualism, 64 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2015), which thoughtfully joins the debate over the
proper methodology of for interpreting regulations. Professor Nou takes issue with aspects of the interpretive approach defended in Interpreting Regulations, and argues for a form of regulatory textualism
that emphasizes those sources most likely to contain sincere, not strategic, statements of the terms of
agreement with the agency’s political principals.
21
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but most estimates take the volume of guidance to substantially exceed that
of regulations,22 and the dockets of administrative tribunals to tower over
those of the federal courts.23 Not every guidance document or agency adjudication interprets the agency’s own regulations. Some interpret the statutory framework directly, for instance. But when disputes about regulatory
interpretation make their way to court, the courts are typically faced with an
agency’s own interpretation of the regulation, either because the agency is a
party to the dispute or has issued a freestanding interpretation. As a result,
for courts, the business of regulatory interpretation often involves addressing an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.
For some time,24 the doctrine associated with Seminole Rock and Auer
has defined review of agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations.
Seminole Rock/Auer states a standard of review—that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”25 As explained in other writing,26 the Seminole Rock/Auer line of authority provides some guidance on how a court is to
judge whether an agency’s interpretation of its regulations is permissible, but
judicial practice has not been consistent. In Seminole Rock, the Court advised
that its “tools . . . are the plain words of the regulation and any relevant interpretations of the Administrator.”27 A strain of precedent relies primarily on
the plain meaning of the regulation. In Auer, for instance, the Court upheld
the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the department’s own regulations
based primarily on dictionary definitions of the critical regulatory phrase
(“subject to”).28 Likewise, in Christensen v. Harris County,29 on the basis of
22 See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 398 (2007) (noting the volume of guidance exceeds that of notice-and-comment
rules); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1468-69 (1992) (noting that
the volume of guidance of the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Aviation Administration, and Nuclear
Regulatory Commission all vastly outnumber their respective formal regulations).
23 Compare SSA Administrative Data: Hearings and Appeals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., at tbl. 2.F9
(2013), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2013/2f8-2f11.pdf (showing that the
Social Security Administration received 849,869 hearing requests in 2012 alone), with Judicial Caseload
Indicators, U.S. COURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/judicialcaseload-indicators.aspx (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (showing that in federal courts in 2013, 56,475
appeals were filed, 284,604 civil cases were filed, and 91,266 criminal cases were filed).
24 See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 16 (exploring the doctrine’s development).
25 See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945))).
26 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 372-73.
27 Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added).
28 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (citing definitions from two dictionaries to support the conclusion that the
phrase “comfortably bears the meaning the Secretary assigns”); see also, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. W.
Fuels-Utah, Inc., 900 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (looking to ordinary usage and the MerriamWebster Dictionary definition to determine the meaning of “supervisory”).
29 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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the text alone, the Court rejected an agency’s construction of a regulation.30
The Court, however, has not justified this particular emphasis on plain meaning, and courts continue to invoke other interpretive tools in determining
whether an agency’s construction is permissible.31 The Supreme Court has
relied on “the Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation,”32 canons of statutory construction,33 statutory language and purpose,34
the consistency of the agency’s interpretation over time,35 the regulation’s
own procedural history,36 and the consistency with the agency’s statement of
basis and purpose.37 In these and other decisions under Seminole Rock, the
Court pays little attention to the interpretive methods it invokes; it does not
30 Id. at 587-88 (“The regulation in this case, however, is not ambiguous—it is plainly permissive.
To defer to the agency’s position would be to permit the agency . . . to create de facto a new regulation.”); see also Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 878-80 (2011) (finding the regulation ambiguous based on text alone); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 514 (1994)
(“The regulation provides, in unambiguous terms, that the ‘costs’ of these educational activities will not
be reimbursed when they are the result of a ‘redistribution,’ or shift, of costs from an ‘educational’
facility to a ‘patient care’ facility . . . .”).
31 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 372-74 (citing examples of this methodological diversity).
32 Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988); see also Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at
512.
33 E.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170 (2007) (invoking a presumption that “the specific governs the general” and citing statutory authorities in which specific statutory
preemption provisions trumped general savings provisions, and specific statutory sentencing provisions
trumped general ones).
34 See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2170-73 (2012) (rejecting
an agency’s interpretation on grounds that it defied statutory language and purposes of statutory provisions); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 401-02 (2008) (rejecting an interpretation of a
regulation because it would be in tension with structure and purposes of authorizing statute); Coke, 551
U.S. at 169-70 (invoking congressional intent as a basis for resolving conflict between literal readings of
two regulations); Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (refusing to defer to the Secretary’s interpretation because it would force the Court “to conclude
that [the Secretary] has not fulfilled her statutory duty”).
35 Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 699 (1991) (deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation, as the same “position has been faithfully advanced by each Secretary since the regulations
were promulgated”); Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159
(1987) (granting deference and noting that the agency’s interpretation “has been, with one exception,
consistently maintained through Board decisions”); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965) (deferring to
the agency and noting that “[s]ince their promulgation, the Secretary has consistently construed both
orders not to bar oil and gas leases”).
36 See, e.g., Gardebring, 485 U.S. at 428 n.14 (drawing an inference that term “recipient” includes
first-time “applicants” for benefits despite the change in language from “applicant or recipient” in proposed regulation to “applicant” in final regulation on the ground that “recipient” was “inadvertently
omitted” (emphasis omitted)).
37 See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2171; Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S.
Ct. 2254, 2263 (2011); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 287-91
(2009) (invoking an agency’s statement of basis and purpose to reject claimed inconsistency between
agency’s actions with its regulations).
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pause to justify its reliance on one method or another, or to distinguish the
case at hand from prior decisions that invoked different interpretive tools.
Indeed, in the Court’s Seminole Rock line of decisions, it is difficult to
discern any attention, much less careful consideration, of the method of
regulatory interpretation.
Seminole Rock has gradually acquired a cluster of academic and judicial critics. These criticisms have largely focused on grounds other than the
Supreme Court’s ad hoc approach to regulatory interpretation under the
doctrine. An appropriate place to start is with Professor Robert Anthony,
who was one of the first to press the point that Seminole Rock rested uncomfortably alongside the APA’s provision on the scope of judicial review,
enacted two years after Seminole Rock was decided.38 Section 706 of the
APA provides that the reviewing court “shall decide all relevant questions
of law . . . and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action.”39 Professor Anthony urged that this provision of the APA
“manifestly was to arm affected persons with recourse to an independent
judicial interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, where, after all, the agency is often an adverse party.”40 The structure of this Section lends some
support for this interpretation.41 Section 706 expressly provides for deferential review in other respects—as to review of facts and the exercise of discretion42—but not as to legal interpretation.43 In addition, Section 706 places
the interpretation of agency action on the same footing as constitutional
interpretation,44 and courts do not generally defer to agencies’ interpretation
of the Constitution. The legislative history of the APA also offers some
support.45
The Supreme Court, however, has not shown particular interest in the
text of the APA when elaborating the standard of review applicable to
agency action (as opposed to review of agency action for compliance with
the APA’s procedural requirements, where the Court has shown more interest in the APA’s text).46 The Chevron doctrine rests with a small toehold of
38

Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, § 10(e) (1946).
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (emphasis added).
40 See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It,
10 ADMIN. L. J. 1, 9 (1996); see also Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 376-77 (noting
this neglect of the APA).
41 John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 113, 193-94
(1998).
42 5 U.S.C. § 706.
43 Duffy, supra note 41, at 194.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 193-94.
46 See Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory Fiction of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the
United States, in EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CORNERSTONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 317, 318-22
(Christopher Forsyth et al. eds. 2010) (arguing that hard look and Chevron doctrines have a tenuous
connection to the APA’s text); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How
39

676

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 22:3

the text of the APA, and the Court’s elaboration of the arbitrary and capricious standard proceeds largely in a common law vein with little concern
for tying the doctrine to the statute.47 Perhaps for this reason, Professor Anthony’s challenge to Seminole Rock on the basis of the APA has not made
much headway before the Court.
The criticism of the Seminole Rock/Auer doctrine that has gained the
most support on the Supreme Court is the argument that the doctrine provides no disincentive for agencies to promulgate vague regulations in part
because the doctrine allows agencies to obtain deference to their own interpretation of those vague regulations. The four-justice dissenting opinion
authored by Justice Clarence Thomas in Thomas Jefferson University Hospital v. Shalala48 is a fount for this critique. There, Justice Thomas argued
that accepting an agency’s construction of a “hopelessly vague regulation”
undermined the purpose of delegation, which is to “resol[ve] . . . ambiguity
in a statutory text”49 by issuing rules that are “clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice concerning the agency’s understanding of the law.”50 Professors Anthony and John Manning elaborated
this line of argument.51 As Professor Manning encapsulates this criticism,
Seminole Rock presents an increased risk of agencies issuing vague regulations because when the agency chooses to adopt vague terms, “it does so
knowing that a court will have no basis for disturbing the agency’s interpretation of empty regulatory terms.”52 Justice Scalia has embraced this line of
reasoning.53
Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 788-91 (2010)
(arguing Chevron is inconsistent with the APA); Duffy, supra note 41, at 118 (noting tension between
APA’s text and Chevron); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common
Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 509 (2010) (arguing that elaboration of hard look and Chevron standards
of review are common law, as opposed to statutory, in character); see generally Jack M. Beermann &
Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 892-900 (2007) (identifying several doctrines that substantially exceed APA § 553’s text). The Supreme Court enforced the text
of the APA more closely when lower courts have imposed procedural requirements beyond the minimum required by the APA. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206-07 (2015)
(“Time and again, we have reiterated that the APA ‘sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to
review executive agency action for procedural correctness.’” (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009))).
47 See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1293, 1299-1300 (2012).
48 512 U.S. 518, 526 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 525 (alteration in original) (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696
(1991)) (second internal quotation marks omitted).
50 Id. at 525.
51 Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 18, at 659-60.
52 Id.
53 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Auer deference encourages agencies to be ‘vague in framing regulations, with
the plan of issuing “interpretations” to create the intended new law without observance of notice and
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This pragmatic concern about the incentives and rewards the doctrine
creates for agencies is frequently accompanied by a broader separation of
powers concern. For Justice Scalia and others writing in this context, Montesquieu is often invoked for the principle that “[w]hen the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of
magistrates, there can be no liberty.”54 The Constitution’s design reflects
that inspiration in many respects. The particular thrust of the concern with
regard to Seminole Rock/Auer is that the doctrine augments the potential for
abuse incident to the consolidation of power in a single institution: the
agency.
The spirit of these general critiques of Seminole Rock, as well as the
thrust of the more specific arguments that its scope needs to be limited to
match that of Chevron,55 finds most prominent expression in the Supreme
Court’s 2012 decision in SmithKline Beecham. In SmithKline Beecham, the
Court declined to apply Seminole Rock/Auer deference to the Department of
Labor’s interpretation of its own regulations in a litigation brief, despite
having recently deferred to agency views expressed in amicus briefs.56 The
specific question before the Court was whether pharmaceutical sales representatives qualified as “outside salesm[e]n,” under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”) as it is administered by the Department of Labor.57 The Department of Labor had defined the statutory term “outside salesman” in its
regulations as “any employee . . . [w]hose primary duty is . . . making sales
within the meaning of” the FLSA.58 Its regulations also stated that “[s]ales
within the meaning of [the statute] include the transfer of title to tangible

comment procedures’” (quoting Anthony, supra note 40, at 11-12)); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel.
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[D]eferring to an agency’s interpretation of
its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications,
to do what it pleases. This frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes
arbitrary government.”).
54 See, e.g., Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting a passage from MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, at 151-52 (O. Piest ed., T. Nugent
trans., 1949)); Talk America, 131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting same passage); Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 18, at 645 (quoting same passage).
55 See scholars cited in supra note 15.
56 In 2011, the Court twice concluded that agency amicus briefs qualify for Seminole Rock deference, rejecting the argument that under Mead and Christensen they should not. See Pliva, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2575 n.3 (2011) (relying on the brief of the United States); Chase Bank USA,
N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 883-84 (2011) (rejecting the argument that an agency amicus brief was
not entitled to deference under Auer, and according deference to the interpretation contained in the
brief).
57 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (2012) (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
58 Id. at 2162 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.500 (2004)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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property.”59 In the preamble to the regulations, the department stressed that
the “outside salesman” exception applies whenever an employee “in some
sense make[s] a sale,”60 and should not depend on technicalities such as
whether the employee “types the order into a computer system and hits the
return button.”61
For many years, the Department of Labor had considered pharmaceutical sales representatives to be “outside salesmen” under the regulations, a
view that is both permissible under the text of the regulation and supported
by the department’s statement in the regulation’s preamble that even those
who “‘in some sense’ make a sale” should be considered outside salesmen.62 In the litigation at issue, the Department of Labor changed course; in
a sequence of amicus briefs in pending cases, it took the position that pharmaceutical sales representatives were not outside salesmen.63 The Court
rejected the argument that it must defer to the department’s new position on
fair notice grounds: “To defer to the agency’s interpretation in this circumstance would seriously undermine the principle that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a regulation] prohibits
or requires.’”64 The Court went on to note that to defer in this case would
“result in precisely the kind of ‘unfair surprise’ against which our cases
have long warned.”65 The Court invoked a bedrock principle of notice, for
which NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.66 provides a classic articulation: an
agency should not be permitted to change the interpretation in an adjudicative proceeding where doing so imposes “new liability . . . on individuals
for past actions which were taken in good-faith reliance on [agency] pronouncements.”67 The Court concluded that deferring to the Department of
Labor’s position in its amicus brief would raise precisely these fair notice
problems.68 The text of the regulations, the Court reasoned, does not give
“clear notice” that the kind of selling in which pharmaceutical representatives engage falls outside of the definition of sales.69 Moreover, the Court
noted that the agency’s prior guidance in its preamble, which explained that
59

Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.503) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted).
60 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive,
Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,162
(Apr. 23, 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Id. (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. at 22,163) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 Id at 2165.
63 SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2165.
64 Id. at 2167 (alteration in original) (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
65 Id. (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170-71 (2007)).
66 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
67 Id. at 295; see also SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2167 (quoting same).
68 SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2167.
69 Id.

2015]

THE INTERPRETIVE DIMENSION OF SEMINOLE ROCK

679

the employee must “in some sense” make a sale, supported this conclusion.70
In light of SmithKline Beecham, its seems very plausible that the Court
would, in an appropriate case, eliminate the disjuncture between the scope
of Chevron and Seminole Rock’s application by limiting Seminole Rock to
agency actions that would qualify for Chevron deference under Mead. That
would eliminate deference to agency briefs under Seminole Rock, but presumably preserve it for agency decisions rendered in formal adjudications.
Or, perhaps, Justice Scalia will be able to persuade his fellow justices to
eliminate the doctrine root-and-branch.
II.

A PROBLEM WITH TWO DIMENSIONS

What has been largely overlooked in this debate over Seminole Rock is
the importance of the reviewing court’s approach to interpreting the regulation at issue—a question that will be all the more front-and-center if the
Court does abandon the doctrine. The extent of deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations, and the incentives that it creates for
agencies, does not only depend on the standard of review the court applies.
Rather, the overall framework for judicial review includes the interpretive
approach the court adopts when it interprets the regulations. The interpretive approach is how the court determines what constitutes the best or the
range of permissible reading of the regulation—say, by reading the regulatory text alone, the text in light of canons of construction, the agency’s justifications for it, and so on.
The point that the interpretive approach matters to how a standard of
review applies is a familiar one in the context of debates over Chevron.
Perhaps the most well-known and robustly stated position on this relationship is the following comment from Justice Scalia:
In my experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the degree to which a person is
(for want of a better word) a “strict constructionist”' of statutes, and the degree to which that
person favors Chevron and is willing to give it broad scope. The reason is obvious. One who
finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its
relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for
Chevron deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an
interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt. Contrariwise, one
who abhors a “plain meaning” rule, and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute

70

Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,162 (Apr.
23, 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 2168 (“It is one thing to expect regulated
parties to conform their conduct to an agency’s interpretations once the agency announces them; it is
quite another to require regulated parties to divine the agency’s interpretations in advance or else be held
liable when the agency announces its interpretations for the first time in an enforcement proceeding and
demands deference.”).
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to be impeached by the legislative history, will more frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of “reasonable” interpretation that the agency
may adopt and to which the courts must pay deference. The frequency with which Chevron
will require that judge to accept an interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely greater.71

If Justices Scalia’s premises are correct, a textualist applying a deferential
standard of review may end up deferring to the agency less often than an
intentionalist applying de novo review, and thus the choice of interpretive
method trumps (or at least substantially mitigates) the choice of standard.
Whether or not one agrees with Justice Scalia’s position that textualists in
statutory interpretation will need to defer less often under Chevron than
those who look to legislative history,72 the more general point is that the
interpretive approach the court adopts influences the operation of the standard of review.
That general point has intuitive appeal, but does it have any empirical
support? Empirical studies have not tested the relative influence of interpretive methodology under Seminole Rock. Empirical work on Chevron and
Skidmore, however, is suggestive of the influence of interpretive choice
within the framework of review. In Professor William Eskridge and Lauren
Baer’s comprehensive study of deference regimes on the Supreme Court
between 1983 and 2005, they found strikingly close agency win rates under
Chevron and Skidmore, with the agency winning in 76.2 percent of cases
under Chevron, and 73.5 percent under Skidmore.73 This finding throws
cold water on the extensive judicial, litigation, and scholarly resources expended on determining whether Chevron or Skidmore applies. This mere
three percent difference between Chevron’s “deferential” standard and “the
power to persuade” of Skidmore suggests that the difference between these
standards of review is not doing a great deal of work, at least in the Supreme Court, in determining how frequently agencies win and lose when
those standards are invoked.74
71

Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 521.
72 In an article close in time to Justice Scalia’s postulation, Professor Merrill suggest that this
point is “at best unproven.” See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 370 (1994) (suggesting, based on a study of four Supreme Court terms, that it is
difficult to support the claim that the dominant effect of legislative history is to expand range of possible
meanings); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008)
(discussing the influence of textualism on Chevron).
73 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 72, at 1142.
74 Some studies show a lower win rate for agencies under Skidmore in the federal courts of appeals. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1275 (2007) (showing a 60 percent agency win rate under Skidmore in
the federal courts of appeals); Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What
Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1896-1905 (2006) (showing lower agency
affirmance rate of 39 percent under Skidmore).
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Eskridge and Baer’s other findings, as well as those of a study by Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein,75 suggest the possible influences
of Justice’s different methods of statutory interpretation. Eskridge and Baer
find a greater difference in the agency win rates among the Supreme Court
justices than reflected in this overall difference in whether Chevron or
Skidmore applies.76 They report, for instance, that the overall agreement rate
with the agency for Justice Stephen Breyer is 72 percent, while Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg is 69.5 percent, Justice Scalia is 64.5 percent, Justice
Thomas is 63.1 percent, and Justice John Paul Stevens is 60.9 percent.77
Specifically testing the agency affirmance rates when Chevron is invoked, Miles and Sunstein found that Justice Breyer’s affirmance rate is
81.8 percent, while Justice Ginsburg is 74.0 percent, Justice Scalia is 52.2
percent and Justice Thomas is 53.6 percent.78 Given the different views
these justices have about how to interpret statutes—roughly, with Justices
Scalia and Thomas favoring textualism, and Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
taking legislative history and broader legal context as more relevant—their
different views of statutory interpretation may play an important role in
explaining their different voting patterns. Miles and Sunstein specifically
tested whether adherence to “plain meaning” methodology explains the
justices’ voting patters in Chevron cases.79 Though Miles and Sunstein’s
empirical tests could not distinguish the influence of interpretive methods
from the justices’ attitudes toward the bureaucracy and pure political preference,80 they find support for Justice’s Scalia’s prediction that adherents to
textualism will defer less often to the agency’s position under Chevron.81
And indeed, they show that in Chevron cases, Justice Scalia himself is the
least likely justice to defer to the agency.82
There are reasons to be cautious about the implications of these findings when considering how much interpretive dimension matters with regard to judging the validity of the agency’s interpretations of its own regulations. First, Eskridge and Baer’s study reports a higher agency win rate—
90.9 percent—under Seminole Rock.83 That higher win rate might suggest a
greater difference between the Seminole Rock and Skidmore standards than
75 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 828-829 (2006) (identifying the influence of approach to
statutory interpretation under Chevron as a “formalist hypothesis” for explaining Chevron outcomes).
76 Compare Eskridge & Baer, supra note 72, at 1099 (showing agency win rate in Supreme Court
is 73.5 percent under Skidmore and 76.2 percent under Chevron), with id. at 1054 (showing range 81.3
percent to 52.6 percent agency win rate by Supreme Court justice).
77 See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 72, at 1154.
78 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 75, at 832 (tbl. 1, col. 1).
79 See id. at 831.
80 Id. at 838.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 826, 832 (tbl. 1, col. 1).
83 Eskridge & Baer, supra note 72, at 1142.

682

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 22:3

Chevron and Skidmore, even though the legal formulation of Seminole Rock
and Chevron’s formulation is quite similar.84 Second, it could be that methods for interpreting regulations are less important than methods of statutory
interpretation, though it is not clear in principle why that would be the case.
Third, even in the detailed studies such as Miles and Sunstein’s, it is hard to
pull apart the explanatory role of interpretive commitments from other confounding political and ideological influences.
Even with these qualifications, this empirical work is, at the very least,
suggestive that the choice of interpretive method matters to how a standard
of review operates. Given that a court cannot avoid adopting an interpretive
approach when it assesses the validity of an agency’s action under the
agency’s own regulation—whether it does so under Seminole Rock or
Skidmore—there is reason to expand the debate about Seminole Rock to
include an interpretive dimension.

III. INTERPRETIVE APPROACH: REGULATORY PURPOSIVISM
So what method of interpretation should courts adopt when interpreting regulations under Seminole Rock (or under another standard)? Does
Justice Scalia’s prediction that textualists defer less often to agency interpretations with which they disagree hold when a court is evaluating an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations? More generally, which
methods of regulatory interpretation will end up being more or less deferential to agencies?
The debate over methods of regulatory interpretation is generations
behind that of statutory interpretation and has hardly considered the interpretive dimension of Seminole Rock. As a way to start this examination, it
makes sense to compare two different approaches to regulatory interpretation—textualism and purposivism. This analysis suggests that regulatory
84 Just as Chevron requires a court to independently assess whether the agency’s interpretation is
precluded by the statute, Seminole Rock requires a court to independently assess whether the agency’s
interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with its regulations. Both doctrines thus involve an
element of independent judicial review to determine if the agency’s action is permissible, and then
deference to the agency’s interpretations inside of those parameters. As a result, contrary to a recent
suggestion of Justice Thomas, Seminole Rock does not (wholly) “preclude[] judges from independently
determining” the meaning of the regulation. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1219
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). That independent judicial judgment is required under Seminole Rock to
determine whether the agency’s interpretation is inconsistent with the regulation before Seminole Rock
triggers deference to the agency. Indeed, Justice Thomas allows as much in noting that Seminole Rock
deference is not absolute, but applies only to interpretations that are plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation. See id. (noting this exception). The substantive disagreement, then, is not over
whether Seminole Rock requires any independent judicial judgment (it does) but over how narrow that
independent check is.
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purposivism, as defined below, is less deferential to post hoc agency interpretations of their own regulations than relying on the text alone whether
review is under the Seminole Rock standard or a more rigorous one such as
Skidmore. This approach to regulatory interpretation also has the prospect
of providing greater notice of a regulation’s meaning than relying on the
regulation’s text alone.
A.

Methods Defined

Over the last decade, the debate over statutory interpretation has gradually resolved into a debate between textualism and purposivism.85 These
two contrasting methodological approaches provide a good point of comparison for evaluating regulatory interpretation.86
Textualism understands the interpreter’s goal is to ascertain a reasonable public meaning of the text.87 With regard to statutes, textualists argue
that legislation frequently lacks an agreed-upon purpose, and therefore it
does not make sense for a judge to interpret legislation in light of purposes
other than those discernible from or expressed in the enacted text—that is,
those “a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”88 Textualists further contend
that a method of statutory interpretation that makes discerning the purpose
of a statute a central feature does not provide an attractive account of the
judicial role.89 Moreover, at a practical level, textualists object that even if
legislative purpose were a coherent idea in statutory interpretation, it is extremely difficult to discern. As a result, trying to do so leads to more judicial errors than focusing on the enacted text.90
Some textualists eschew relying on legislative intent on the ground
that the intent of the lawmakers is not is publically available as a source of
notice. In this vein, Justice Scalia writes, “it is simply incompatible with
85

See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 75 (2006) (describing the remaining differences between textualism and purposivism); Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2006) (characterizing the same).
86 As noted above, Professor Nou’s forthcoming article, Regulatory Textualism, joins this debate,
see supra note 21; though timing did not permit discussion of her arguments in this Article, the interested reader will find in Professor Nou’s article points of overlap and disagreement on the proper technique
of regulatory interpretation as well as on the account of regulatory textualism relevant to the discussion
below.
87 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
17 (Amy Gutmann ed.,1997); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387,
2410-13 (2003).
88 SCALIA, supra note 87, at 17.
89 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547-48 (1983).
90 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 112 (2006) (arguing that consulting legislative history increased incidents of
judicial error in ways not shared by statutory text).
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democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the
meaning of the law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by
what the lawgiver promulgated.”91 On this point, Justice Scalia invokes the
Roman emperor Nero, who posted edicts high up on pillars so they could
not easily be read.92 With regard to regulations, a textualist approach would
seek to interpret the regulation based on the text of the regulation itself, as
the binding document that constitutes the law, understood against the semantic context of other regulations and related statutes. This view may undergird the Supreme Court’s occasional reference to the plain meaning of
the regulations as the interpretive question under Seminole Rock.93
The formulation of purposivism for regulations at issue here has two
important elements. The first is a commitment to interpreting the regulation
in accordance with its text. In this sense, it operates very much the same
way as textualism; it seeks to understand the best reading of the text in its
semantic context, and thus has much in common with what has been called
the new purposivism94 or with regard to statutes, a reading that has a strong
foundation in Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks’s legal process materials.95 Second, the reader should check the prospective construction of the
regulatory text to see that it accords with the agency’s own public justification and explanation of the regulation provided in the “statement of basis
and purpose,”96 which forms the bulk of the preamble. Because a regulation
issued through notice-and-comment is not procedurally or substantively
valid without such a statement,97 interpreting a regulation in light of the
statement of basis and purpose is not seeking to interpret the regulation
through an unexpressed intent. Accordingly, it does not raise the specter of
emperor Nero that Justice Scalia invokes. Paying close attention to the preamble is a focus on a public source of justification of the regulation. This
approach requires that the interpretation of the regulation be at least consistent with the purposes and other positions the agency has set forth in its
exposition for the rule appearing in its statement of basis and purpose. For
this regulatory purposivist approach, then, there are two privileged interpre91

SCALIA, supra note 87, at 17.
Id.
93 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
94 See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 117 (characterizing a
new strain in the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases where the purpose only plays a role if
the text is broad enough to permit it).
95 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 385-91 (highlighting the role of enacted
purpose and text for Hart and Sacks and foundations of this view in their principle of “institutional
settlement”); see also Manning, supra note 94, at 117-18 (highlighting institutional settlement’s role for
Hart and Sacks and recent judicial decisions reflecting that role).
96 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
97 See New Eng. Coal. on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 727 F.2d 1127, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (to
compy with APA § 553(c) “an agency rule must be accompanied by a statement of basis and purpose”
to be procedurally valid).
92
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tive sources: the text of the regulation and the justification and explanation
of the regulation provided in the statement of basis and purpose,98 with the
regulatory text governing in case of conflict.
B.

Deference and Range of Acceptable Meanings

As an interpretive approach, regulatory purposivism results in a narrower range of acceptable or permissible readings of regulations than
textualism. This is most easily seen by comparing the two approaches under
the deferential Seminole Rock/Auer standard. For a court applying this deferential standard of review, the doctrinal question is whether the agency’s
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” that
is, whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissible one. Now consider
how a textualist and a regulatory purposivist address that question. For a
textualist, the sole question is whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissible reading of the text of the regulation. A regulatory purposivist asks
the same question the textualist does about what is permissible under the
text, but also adds a separate inquiry as to whether any given construction is
consistent with (or carries forward) the justification and explanations for the
regulation in the preamble.
In principle, then, the range of permissible interpretations for a
purposivist is narrower than for a textualist. One can think of this as two
intersecting circles of a Venn diagram, as depicted in Figure 1 below, with
one circle representing the textually permissible interpretations, and the
other representing interpretations consistent with the regulation’s preamble.
The textualist will defer to any interpretation that is textually permissible,
as represented by those within the left circle. A nontextually constrained
purposivist would defer to interpretations in the right circle. In contrast to
both of these approaches, a regulatory purposivist will defer only to interpretations in the shaded portion where the two circles overlap. Because the
regulatory purposivist approach has an additional requirement for an interpretation to be a permissible one—textual permissibility plus consistency
with purposes and other statements in the preamble—a court deploying this
approach will find a narrower set of interpretations consistent with the regulations under Seminole Rock than a court applying a texualist approach. As
a result, when a court employs a regulatory purposivist approach under
Seminole Rock, the agency has less flexibility in interpreting its own regulations than it would under a textualist approach.

98

See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 398.

686

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 22:3

Figure 1

Interpretations
Permitted by the
Regulation’s Text

Interpretations Consistent
with the Regulation’s the
Preamble

This result is not limited to a court applying Seminole Rock. Even if
the court were applying a Skidmore or de novo standard of review, the regulatory purposivist method would identify a narrower set of readings acceptable than a textualist method would. If the text of the regulation is
clear, there should be no difference between the two approaches; both will
follow the clear meaning of the regulation’s text. But with regard to ambiguous regulations, the regulatory purposivist approach should result in the
court deferring to an agency’s ex post interpretation of the regulation less
often than a textualist approach. The reason runs parallel to the one above:
if the regulation’s text is ambiguous, a court looking for a reading that
makes the most sense of the regulation’s text and the commitments the
agency made in its preamble should end up finding a narrower range of
agency interpretations convincing. The additional requirement of interpreting the ambiguous regulatory text in light of the preamble constrains, at
least in principle, the scope of interpretations allowed by ambiguous regulatory text. Accordingly, a regulatory purposivist should be less deferential
under Skidmore to an agency’s later issued interpretations than a textualist
because a narrower range of interpretations will be acceptable to the regulatory purposivist.
Whether applied under Seminole Rock or Skidmore, this textually constrained purposivist approach effectively uses the agency’s prior commitments in the preamble to limit the scope of its later interpretation. As a result, this method grants less deference than textualism to the agency’s later
issued interpretations, but does so by granting a greater interpretive role
than textualism would to the agency’s contemporaneous justification of its
regulations appearing in regulatory preambles.
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Predictability

An interpretive approach that identifies a narrower range of acceptable
meanings may augment notice of the meaning; a relatively small set of acceptable meanings reduces uncertainty for the regulated. Still, an approach
that identifies a narrower range of acceptable meanings does no good if no
one can figure out what they are. To provide greater notice, an interpretive
approach must have a claim to producing results that are more predictable
to the relevant audience, not just specifying a narrower range of permissible
meanings.
Because regulatory purposivism relies on the examination of extratextual sources—the statement of basis and purpose included in the regulation’s preamble—as part of the interpretive method, it has a special burden
to overcome with regard to predictability. A common criticism of statutory
interpretation methods that rely on consulting legislative history, for instance, is that they lead to more frequent judicial errors, and thus less predictability. From this perspective, consulting extra-textual sources confounds predictability as opposed to augmenting it.
Several distinctive legal features of regulations suggest that the enterprise of gaining guidance from a regulatory preamble promises more predictability than working with legislative history. Unlike statutes, the validity of regulations depends upon their being issued with a “statement of their
basis and purpose,”99 which explains the grounds and purposes of the regulations in light of statutory objectives.100 Regulations are not procedurally
valid unless they include this accompanying statement.101 Further, under
well-established doctrines of administrative law, the substantive validity of
regulations is also judged on the basis of these statements.102 This way in
which the text of a regulation and the statement of basis and purpose are
bound up together—a rule’s validity depends upon its statement—
99

See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring the agency to issue a “statement of their basis and purpose”).
See also H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 259 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 225 (2d Sess. 1946). The Senate Document contains as
an appendix the Attorney General’s 1945 report on Senate Bill 7. The Attorney General’s report stated
the following in regards to the statement of basis and purpose:
Section 4 (b), in requiring the publication of a concise general statement of the basis and
purpose of rules made without formal hearing, is not intended to require an elaborate analysis
of rules or of the detailed considerations upon which they are based but is designed to enable
the public to obtain a general idea of the purpose of, and a statement of the basic justification
for, the rules. The requirement would also serve much the same function as the whereas
clauses which are now customarily found in the preambles of Executive orders.
Id.
100 Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Dole, 809 F.2d 847, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
101 Id.
102 See Stack, Interpreting Regulations, supra note 21, at 379 (explaining rule of these statements
in substantive review of agency regulations).
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strengthens the grounds for reading the rule in light of the explanatory
statement.
In addition, at a practical level, the statement of basis and purpose facilitates its use by courts and the public in a way that is not true of legislative history. First, legislative history includes multiple types of sources
(e.g., committee reports, floor statements, etc.), from multiple different
voices, over extended periods of time. Each part of the legislative history
represents the views of only a subpart of the legislature. In contrast, preambles are issued on behalf of the agency itself, not a subgroup within it; they
constitute authoritative guidance about the agency’s understanding of the
meaning of the regulations at the time they are issued. This message comes
through clearly in the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act.103 Of the statement of basis and purpose, the Manual opines,
“[t]he required statement will be important in that the courts and the public
may be expected to use such statements in the interpretation of the agency’s
rules.”104 Moreover, because the validity of the rule depends upon the quality of the agency’s reasoning in these statements, in general, they are carefully crafted, highly organized documents, issued in a single voice.105 In
short, discerning guidance from preambles about the meaning of the regulations is more practical than using the multiple sources of legislative history
in statutory interpretation.
Suppose, then, that consulting regulatory preambles is not subject to
the same practical objections levied against legislative history. That leaves
us with the difficult question of whether it is easier to predict how the
meaning of an ambiguous regulation will be fixed by, on the one hand, consulting the regulation’s preamble as a privileged source for limiting its
scope, or, on the other hand, redoubling efforts at affixing meaning from
the regulatory text alone. As opposed to addressing this point abstractly,
let’s turn to an example to suggest the promise of preambles to narrow ambiguous regulatory language in a predictable way.
D.

No Drones in the Park?

The most famous hypothetical for teasing apart the difference between
textualism and more purpose-based forms of interpretation is Professors
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller’s debate over the application of a “no vehicles
103

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 32 (1947).
104 Id.
105 The Administrative Conference of the United States recently issued a recommendation that
recognized the guidance function of preambles and proposed a set of best practices for agencies in the
drafting of preambles to facilitate that function. See Adoption of Recommendations, 79 Fed. Reg.
35,988, 35,992 (June 25, 2014). The author of this Article was the consultant to the Conference on this
project.
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in the park” prohibition.106 Current technology has turned up a new iteration
of this hypothetical for the age of regulatory interpretation: are unmanned
aircraft allowed in the national parks?
This summer the National Park Service (“NPS”) issued a Policy
Memorandum to the superintendents of the National Parks to prohibit the
flying of drones in their parks.107 The memorandum advised the superintendents to invoke their authority under a provision of the NPS regulations that
authorizes the superintendents to impose limitations on the use of the parks
based on a finding that such a limit is necessary for “maintenance of public
health and safety, protection of environmental or scenic values”108 among
other values, so long as those limits are “[c]onsistent with applicable legislation and Federal administrative policies.”109 This memorandum stated that
the park superintendents should invoke this emergency authority “[b]ecause
the existing NPS regulations can only be used to address unmanned aircraft
in certain circumstances.”110 One might ask, then, whether prohibiting
drones on this basis is consistent with other NPS regulations?
The NPS regulations concerning aircraft and air delivery prohibit
“[o]perating or using aircraft on lands or waters other than at locations designated pursuant to special regulations” as well as “[d]elivering or retrieving a person or object by parachute, helicopter, or other airborne means,
except in emergencies involving public safety or serious property loss, or
pursuant to the terms and conditions of a permit.”111 The regulations define
“aircraft” as “a device that is used or intended to be used for human flight
in the air, including powerless flight.”112 Because the drones in question are
not used for human flight, the principal question, then, is whether a drone
would constitute the “delivering . . . [of an] object by . . . airborne
means.”113
Based on the text of the NPS regulations alone, one could make credible arguments either way. On the one hand, the word “delivery” suggests
transport of something other than the means of airborne propulsion itself.
On the other hand, the person controlling the drone might be thought to be
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H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-11
(1958); see also Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109,
1109-10 (2008) (discussing the debate surrounding this most famous hypothetical).
107 See Memorandum from Jonathan B. Jarvis, Dir., Nat’l Park Serv., to Reg’l Dirs. & Superintendents, Policy Memorandum 14-05 (June 19, 2014) [hereinafter Jarvis Memorandum], available at
www.nps.gov/policy/PolMemos/PM_14-05.htm.
108 36 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2013).
109 Id.
110 Jarvis Memorandum, supra note 107.
111 36 C.F.R. § 2.17.
112 36 C.F.R. § 1.4.
113 36 C.F.R. § 2.17.
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“delivering” the drone itself, a position taken by at least one of the parks.114
Perhaps textualist ingenuity might find one or the other of these readings
more persuasive based on the text alone, or its surrounding semantic context. But that is in part the point; with a constrained set of tools, the
textualist is forced to a moment of creative ingenuity, 115 which does not
bode particularly well for the predictability of results. Now consider the
preamble to the regulations. The preamble includes the following statement:
“This regulation limits the operation and use of aircraft to designated areas
and generally prohibits the air delivery of persons or property.”116 This
statement provides solid support for the idea that the prohibition is on the
depositing of something tangible, whether it is persons or property. Faced
with a choice between making textual inferences alone or bringing in this
part of the agency’s own articulated explanation of the scope of the regulation, consulting the preamble gives the interpreter a more sure-footed basis
for a conclusion. This is not to say that every preamble provides a helpful
basis to ensure that the agency’s interpretation is consistent with the agency’s original understanding, but many do.117
What this stylized example suggests is that insisting that an agency’s
interpretation is consistent with the positions it took in the preamble reduces the range of acceptable interpretations in a way accessible to the audience to whom the regulations apply. As opposed to inviting creative textual
inferences, this approach offers something more quotidian, parsing the regulatory text in relation to the preamble. In that, it has a claim to offering
more predictable interpretation.
E.

Systematic Effects and Objections

A regulatory purposivism approach of this kind treats the agency’s justification for a regulation as something more than an elaborate nuisance
necessary for the regulations to survive judicial challenge; it treats that reason-giving exercise as creating commitments to the scope of application of
the regulation. Treating preambles in this way augments the extent to which
litigants and the public can use them as a source of guidance about the
114

See Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Drones) Prohibited in Yosemite National Park, NAT’L
PARK SERV. (May 2, 2014), http://www.nps.gov/yose/parknews/use-of-unmanned-aircraft-systemsdrones-prohibited-in-yosemite-national-park.htm (invoking 36 C.F.R. § 2.17 to justify the prohibition).
115 See Merrill, supra note 72, at 373 (stating that with fewer interpretive tools the textualist “has to
become more imaginative”).
116 48 Fed. Reg. 30,268 (June 30, 1983).
117 See KEVIN M. STACK, GUIDANCE IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS: EVALUATING PREAMBLES,
REGULATORY TEXT, AND FREESTANDING DOCUMENTS AS VEHICLES FOR REGULATORY GUIDANCE 34
(2014), available at http://www.acus.gov/report/final-guidance-rulemaking-process-evaluatingpreambles-regulatory-text-and-freestanding (report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the
United States) (suggesting that agencies generally provided a detailed justifications for their rules).
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proper construction of the regulation, and consistent with their guidance
function.118 As a result, it would reduce agency flexibility to interpret their
regulations in ways that may be plausible under the regulation’s text but
inconsistent with the policies the agency posited as justifying the regulations. That reduced flexibility, however, would directly serve the value of
fair notice because it would allow the public to rely on the agency’s reasons
for its regulations as a source of guidance.
Some might object that this approach gives agencies divergent and undesirable incentives. On the one hand, it might be seen as giving agencies
incentives to say as little as possible in their preambles to reduce the scope
of interpretive constraint that their preambles create. The relatively demanding scope of hard look review, however, gives agencies strong countervailing incentives to carefully rationalize their regulations or face judicial
reversal. Because those rationalizations are necessary for regulations to
survive judicial review, those incentives to provide detailed explanations
likely overwhelm the agency’s interest in preserving interpretive flexibility.
Hard look review, in other words, provides a baseline requirement of relatively elaborate reason-giving, reasons to which the agency can be held in
future interpretation of its regulations.
On the other hand, this approach might be viewed as giving agencies
incentives to load their preambles with policy statements about their regulations that they were not able—for political reasons, or otherwise—to include in the regulatory text. Here it is important to recall that statements in
which the agency purports to bind must appear in the regulatory text;119
preambles are not binding but merely guidance about the meaning of the
text. As a result, a court will not treat the text of a preamble as creating
binding obligation,120 and the agency will have to adopt regulatory text to
118

See Adoption of Recommendations, 79 Fed. Reg. 35,988, 35,992 (June 25, 2014) (noting the
guidance function of preambles).
119 STACK, supra note 117, at 23 (“As a matter of blackletter law, under APA § 553, a ‘legislative’
rule must be subject to notice-and-comment whereas interpretative statements and general statements of
policy are not. Thus, if a preamble or guidance document includes a statement that is a legislative rule,
the rule is procedurally invalid under section 553.” (footnote omitted)).
120 While language in preambles is not occasionally challenged as improper legislative rules, courts
have generally held that statements in preambles are interpretive rules or general statements of policy,
and thus procedurally valid. See, e.g., Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(EPA’s premabular statement “merely informed the public that the agency would exercise its discretion
by considering exposure only for low toxicity chemicals” and thus was a general policy statement);
Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1308-09 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the EPA’s rule in its
preamble was interpretive because it “represents the agency’s attempt to interpret the meaning of a
statutory provision”); Comité de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agrícolas v. Solis, No. 09-240, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90155, at *47 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010) (holding that the preambular language was an
interpretation because the language was “tied very closely” to the definition included in the regulation
and “expressly purports to be an interpretation of that definition”); Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. v.
Whitman, 260 F. Supp. 2d 28, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (“In this case, the interpretation [contained within the
preamble] . . . is within the scope of the regulation . . . .”); Bd. of Trustees of Knox Cnty. Hosp. v.
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bind the public. That reduces the utility of the preamble to provide an endrun around having to include the statements in regulatory text. Moreover, it
is not clear what harm there is in an agency providing a very elaborate preamble. Indeed, the more detailed the preamble the greater interpretive constraint it imposes on the agency, at least under a regulatory purposivism
approach.
These arguments suggest that regulatory purposivism is less deferential than textualism when applied in reviewing the validity of agency’s post
hoc interpretations of their regulations. Effectively the added constraint this
approach provides derives from accepting (or deferring) to the agency’s
original justifications for its regulations, but being less deferential to subsequent agency interpretations that are not consistent with those original justifications. That provides grounds to suggest that, with regard to ambiguous
texts, regulatory purposivism also provides greater notice to the regulated
by identifying a narrower range of acceptable meanings and is arguably
more predictable than a textualist approach.
This is not a complete defense of regulatory purposivism as an approach to regulatory interpretation. One could still ask how this approach
fares with regard to other values, such as the deference rationale of Chevron,121 and background principles of political accountability. Nor does this
interpretive approach directly address the incentives Seminole Rock may
provide agencies to issue vague regulations. But hopefully it is suggestive
of the fair notice and predictability gains of interpreting the text of regulations in light of their preambles.

CONCLUSION
The debate over the merits of Seminole Rock and Auer for review of
agency interpretations of their own regulations has proceeded on familiar
lines. Critics have challenged the doctrine’s consistency with rule-of-law
Shalala, 959 F. Supp. 1026, 1031 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (“Rather than create or destroy substantive rights, the
[preambular] policy simply clarifies what the Secretary believes the regulation means and explains how
the Agency will apply it.”); OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States, 921 F. Supp. 812, 824 n.11 (D.D.C.
1996) (explaining that an interpretation within the preamble does not transform the preamble into a legislative rule). See also STACK, supra note 117, at 24 n.133.
121 See Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to
Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 132 (2000) (arguing that the entity that
controls the meaning of the regulation has effective control over the meaning of the statute, and as a
result, Seminole Rock deference is required to implement the delegation of interpretive authority over
the statute to the agency recognized by Chevron); Melanie E. Walker, Comment, Congressional Intent
and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (1999) (arguing
that delegation of interpretive authority to an agency under Chevron also involves Seminole Rock-style
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations).
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values and separation of powers; others have shown that the doctrine has
expanded well beyond its origins. But this debate has not attended to the
threshold issue implicated in Seminole Rock/Auer and under any standard
addressing review of agency interpretation of their own regulations—the
method of regulatory interpretation. Focusing on how the courts construe
the regulation reveals that the method of interpretation may make as much
difference to the outcome of review, and values underlying the debate over
Seminole Rock/Auer, as whether the Court continues to apply the Seminole
Rock/Auer doctrine or adopts a less deferential standard of review. In particular, an approach to interpreting regulations that insists on consistency
with the regulation’s text and the commitments the agency made in its preamble constrains the agency to a narrower set of possible meanings than
looking to the text alone. That does not tell us whether the Court should
retain or abandon the Seminole Rock/Auer doctrine, but it does suggest that
the interpretive approaches make a difference to when that standard results
in deference to the agency.

